The Assignment problem is a fundamental, well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, we seek a pareto optimal allocation of items to agents given the preferences of the agents. We introduce a generalized version of this problem, where each agent is equipped with multiple incomplete preference lists: each list (called a layer) is a ranking of items in a possibly different way according to a different criterion. We introduce a new concept of pareto optimality, and study the generalized version of the problem from the perspective of Parameterized Complexity. Here, we consider several natural parameters such as the number of layers, number of agents, number of items, and maximal length of a preference list; we present a comprehensive picture of the parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to these parameters.
Introduction
The class of resource allocation problems has been widely studied in recent years. A fundamental and one of the most well-studied problems in this field is the Assignment problem [2, 8, 1, 3, 21, 5, 4, 18, 14] . In the Assignment problem we are given a set of n agents, and a set of m items. Each agent has strict preferences over a subset of items, and the objective is to find an assignment (namely, a matching of agents to items) that allocates the items to the agents in an "optimal" way. Different notions of optimality have been considered in the literature, but one that has received the most attention is pareto optimality. Intuitively, an assignment p is called pareto optimal if there is no other assignment q that is at least good as p for all agents and also strictly better than p for at least one agent.
Besides its theoretical interest, the problem has also significant practical importance. Algorithms for the Assignment problem have applications in a variety of real-world situations, such as assigning jobs to workers, campus houses to students, time stamps to users on a common machine, players to sports teams, graduating medical students to their first hospital appointments, and so on.
A simple and well-studied allocation mechanism is the greedy serial dictatorship mechanism, introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez [2] . In the serial dictatorship mechanism, we draw a random permutation on the agents from the uniform distribution. The agent that is ordered first in the permutation is assigned to its top choice, the agent ordered second is assigned to its top choice among the remaining items and so on. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez [2] proved that applying this mechanism results in a pareto optimal assignment.
In this paper, we consider an extension to the Assignment problem in which the agents may have multiple preference lists (rather than only one). In the classic Assignment problem, each agent has exactly one preference list. The preference lists may represent a single subjective criterion according to which each agent ranks the items. However, it may also represent a combination of different such criteria: each agent associates a score to each item per criterion, and a single preference list is derived from some weighted sum of the scores. In many cases, it is unclear how to combine scores associated with criteria of inherently incomparable nature -that is like "comparing apples with oranges". Additionally, even if a single list can be forcefully extracted, most data is lost. Thus, the classic model seems somewhat restrictive in real world scenarios where people rely on highly varied aspects to rank other entities. For example, suppose that there are n job candidates who need to be assigned to n positions. The recruiters may rank the candidates for each position according to different criteria, such as academic background, their experience in each specific field, impression by the interview, and so on. This motivates the employment of multiple preference lists where each preference list (called a layer) is defined by a different criterion.
Our work is inspired by the work of Chen et al. [10] , who studied the Stable Marriage problem under multiple preferences. In contrast to the Assignment problem, the Stable Marriage problem is a two-sided matching problem, i.e. it consists of two disjoint sets of agents A and B, such that each agent strictly ranks the agents of the opposite set (in the Assignment problem, only the agents rank the items). The objective in the Stable Marriage problem is to find a matching between A and B such that there do not exist agents a ∈ A, b ∈ B which are not matched to each other but rank each other higher than their matched partners (Irvin [17] extended this definition to the case in which the preference lists may have ties).
Chen et al. [10] considered an extension of the Stable Marriage problem where there are layers of preferences. Thus, the definition of stability should be changed accordingly; three notions of stability were defined: α-global stability, α-pair stability, and α-individual stability. In their work, Chen et al. [10] studied the algorithmic complexity of finding matchings that satisfy each of these stability notions. The notion of α-global stability extends the original one in a straightforward and natural way by requiring a matching to be stable in some α layers. Our notion of optimality for the extension of the Assignment problem is very similar to this definition such that it requires an assignment to be pareto optimal in some α layers.
In contrast to [10] , our research focuses more on the aspect of parameterized complexity. We take into account a variety of parameters ( [10] focuses only on the parameter α), and we provide parameterized algorithms, parameterized hardness results, and ETH-based lower bounds regarding them ( [10] focuses only on parameterized hardness results). We also study the kernelization of the problem: We provide 2 kernels, and lower bounds on kernel sizes.
Although the Assignment problem can be easily solved in polynomial time using the serial dictatorship mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez [2] ), the problem becomes harder when multiple preference lists are taken into account.
The Assignment problem and the Stable Marriage problem. On first sight, it may seem that the Assignment problem is a special case of the Stable Marriage problem with indifference [17] (the preferences of the agents remain the same, and all the items rank all the agents equally). We mention that it is a completely different problem since pareto optimality is not equivalent to the stability notions defined by Irving [17] for the the Stable Marriage problem with indifference. Suppose the following instance of the Assignment problem with 3 agents a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , and 3 items b 1 , b 2 , b 3 :
We transfer this instance to an instance of Stable Marriage with indifference by making all the items to rank a 1 , a 2 and a 3 equally as follows:
Suppose the matching p that satisfies p(a i ) = b i for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, p is pareto optimal for the Assignment instance, but it is not strongly stable (see [17] for the definition) for the constructed Stable Marriage instance since {a 2 , b 3 } is a blocking pair. Suppose the matching q that satisfies q(a 1 ) = b 2 , q(a 2 ) = b 1 and q(a 3 ) = b 3 . Then, q is not pareto optimal for the Assignment instance, but it is weakly stable and even super stable for the Stable Marriage instance. Thus, we conclude that the problems are different from each other.
Contributions and Methods
We consider several parameters such as the number of layers , number of agents, number of items, maximal length of a preference list d, and the given number of layers α for which we require an assignment to be pareto optimal; we present a comprehensive picture of the parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to these parameters. Arguably, the choice of these parameters is natural and sensible because in real-life scenarios as those mentioned above, some of these parameters may be substantially smaller than the input size. A summary of our results is given in Table 1 .
NP-Hardness.
We first prove that the problem is NP-hard when 2 ≤ α ≤ by presenting a polynomial reduction from the Serial Dictatorship Feasibility problem (defined in Section 3) that relies on a reduction by Aziz el al. [5] . We also define three polynomial-time constructions of preference profiles given an instance of 3-SAT, and we rely on them in the construction of a polynomial reduction from 3-SAT to the problem, such that in the resulting instance α + + d is bounded by a fixed constant. By this result, we conclude that the problem is para-NP-hard for the parameter α + + d.
Kernelization. We prove that the problem admits a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter #agents + . Roughly speaking, for each agent, the kernel keeps only the first #agents most preferred items that appear in its preference lists. The resulting instance is equivalent due to a proposition stating that each pareto optimal assignment must assign each agent to an item that is ranked in some position j in its preference list where j ≤ #agents. Furthermore, we prove that the problem is FPT with respect to the parameter #items + by providing a double-exponential kernel. We also prove that the problem does not admit polynomial kernels for the parameters #agents + #items + α, #agents + #items + ( − α), and #items + using three cross-compositions (defined in Section 2) from 3-SAT which rely on the constructions of preference profiles defined in Section 3.
Fixed-Parameter Tractability and ETH Based Lower Bounds.
We prove that the problem is FPT with respect to the parameter n = #agents by providing an O * (n!) time algorithm. Informally speaking, the algorithm applies serial dictatorship with respect to all possible permutations over the agents in each layer until it finds an α-globally optimal assignment or declares that no such Table 1 Summary of our results. Results marked with * are proved to be optimal under the ETH; n and m denote the number of agents and the number of items, respectively. assignment exists. We then prove that O * (2 O(k log k) ) is a tight lower bound on the running time under ETH (defined in Section 2) for the parameters k = #agents+#items+α and k = #agents+#items+( −α) using linear parameter reductions from the k × k Permutation Clique problem. That makes the algorithm optimal under the ETH. We also prove that the problem is XP with respect to the parameter m = #items by providing a m O(m) · n O(m) time algorithm (n denotes the number of agents). Lastly, we prove that the problem is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameters #items + α and #items + ( − α) using two parameterized reductions from Multicolored Independent Set.
Preliminaries
For any natural number t, we denote the set {1, . . . , t} by [t]. We use the O *notation to suppress polynomial factors in the input size, that is, O * (f (k)) means f (k) · n O(1) .
The Assignment
Problem. An instance of the Assignment problem is a triple (A, I, P ) where A is a set of n agents {a 1 , . . . , a n }, I is a set of m items {b 1 , . . . , b m }, and P = (< a1 , . . . , < an ), called the preference profile, contains the preferences of the agents over the items, where each < ai encodes the preferences of a i and is a linear order (i.e. antisymmetric, transitive, and connex) over a subset of I (preferences are allowed to be incomplete). We refer to such linear orders as preference lists. If b j < ai b r , we say that agent a i prefers item b r over item b j , and we write b
is acceptable by agent a if b appears in a's preference list. An assignment is an allocation of items to agents such that each agent is allocated at most one item, and each item is allocated to at most one agent. Since the preferences of the agents may be incomplete, or the number of items may be smaller than the number of agents, some agents may not have available items to be assigned to. In order to deal with this case, we define a special item b ∅ , which we see as the least preferred item of each agent, and will be used as a sign that an agent is not allocated an item. Through out this paper, we assume that b ∅ is not part of the item sets, and that it appears at the end of every preference list (we will not write b ∅ explicitly in the preference lists). Formally, an assignment p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } is an allocation of items to agents, satisfying that for each i ∈ [n]: (1) p(a i ) = b ∅ , or (2) both p(a i ) ∈ I and for each j ∈ [n] \ {i}, p(a i ) = p(a j ). We refer to p as legal if it satisfies p(a i ) = b ∅ or that p(a i ) ∈ I is acceptable by a i for each i ∈ [n]. For brevity, we will omit the term "legal" and refer to a legal assignment just as an assignment. We will use it only when we want to emphasize that some assignment is legal (or not legal).
Optimality. Informally speaking, an assignment p is pareto optimal if there does not exist another assignment q that is "at least as good" as p for all the agents, and is "better" for at least one agent. Formally, p is pareto optimal if there does not exist another assignment q such that p(a i ) ≤ ai q(a i ) for every i ∈ [n], and there exists i ∈ [n] such that p(a i ) < ai q(a i ). If such an assignment q exists, we say that q pareto dominates p.
We first give some well-known characterizations of pareto optimal assignments that are useful for our research. Intuitively, an assignment admits a trading cycle if there exists a set of agents who all benefit by exchanging their allocated items among themselves. For example, a simple trading cycle among two agents a and b occurs when agent a prefers agent b's item over its own item, and agent b prefers agent a's item over its own item. Both a and b would benefit from exchanging their items. Formally, a trading cycle is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. An assignment p admits a self loop if there exist an agent a i and an item b j such that b j is not allocated to any agent by p, and p(a i ) < ai b j . Proposition 2.3 (Folklore; see, e.g., Aziz et al. [5, 4] ). An assignment p is pareto optimal if and only if it does not admit trading cycles and self loops.
By this proposition, the problem of checking whether an assignment admits trading cycles or self loops can be reduced to the problem of checking whether a directed graph contains cycles. For instance (A, I, P ) and assignment p, the corresponding trading graph is the directed graph defined as follows. Its vertex set is A ∪ I, and there are three types of edges:
• For each a ∈ A such that p(a) = b ∅ , there is a directed edge from p(a) to a. Namely, each allocated item points to its owner. • For each agent a ∈ A, there is an edge from a to all the items it prefers over its assigned item p(a) (if p(a) = b ∅ , a points to all its acceptable items). • Each item with no owner points to all the agents that accept it. Proposition 2.4 (Folklore; see, e.g., Aziz et al. [5, 4] ). An assignment p is pareto optimal if and only if its corresponding trading graph does not contain cycles.
A simple assignment mechanism is the greedy serial dictatorship mechanism. For a given permutation over the agents, the mechanism takes each agent in turns, according to the permutation. The agent which is ordered first allocates its most preferred item, the second allocates its most preferred item among the remaining items, and so on. If at some point, an agent has no available item to allocate in its preference list, it allocates b ∅ . We say that an assignment p is a possible outcome of serial dictatorship if there exists a permutation π such that applying serial dictatorship with respect to π results in p. Proposition 2.5 (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez [2] ). An assignment p is pareto optimal if and only if it is a possible outcome of serial dictatorship. Corollary 2.6. A pareto optimal assignment always exists and can be found in polynomial time, and the number of pareto optimal assignments for an instance with n agents is at most n!. Proposition 2.5 yields a surjective mapping from the set of permutations on the agents to the set of pareto optimal assignments. This implies an upper bound of n! on the number of pareto optimal assignments. Observe that this bound is tight: consider an instance where there is an equal number of agents and items, and all the agents share the same complete preference list. Observe that each permutation gives us a unique assignment after applying serial dictatorship with respect to it. Thus, there exist exactly n! pareto optimal assignments.
Generalization of the Assignment Problem. We introduce a generalized version of the Assignment problem where there are layers of preferences. For each j ∈ [ ], we refer to < (j) ai as a i 's preference list in layer j. The preference profile in layer j is the collection of the agents' preference lists in the layer, namely,
an ). We say that assignment p is pareto optimal in layer j if it is pareto optimal in the single-layered instance (A, I, P j ). To adapt the notion of optimality to the new context, we introduce a natural generalization requiring an assignment to be optimal in a given number of layers. Definition 2.7. An assignment p is α-globally optimal for an instance (A, I, P 1 , . . . , P ) if there exist α layers i 1 , . . . , i α ∈ [ ] such that p is pareto optimal in layer i j for each j ∈ [α].
Thus, the new problem is defined as follows.
Globally Optimal Assignment Input: (A, I, P 1 , . . . , P , α), where A is a set of n agents, I is a set of m items, P i is the preference profile in layer i for each i ∈ [ ], and α ∈ [ ]. Question: Does an α-globally optimal assignment exist?
Example. Consider the following instance, where the agent set is A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 }, the item set is I = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , b 4 }, and there are four layers, defined as follows.
Layer 1:
Layer 2:
Layer 3:
Layer 4:
Consider an assignment p in which a i gets b i for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and a 4 gets b ∅ . The assignment is 2-globally optimal since it is pareto optimal in the first two layers. To see this, apply serial dictatorship in the first layer with respect to the permutation (a 1 , a 3 , a 2 , a 4 ), and in the second layer with respect to the permutation (a 2 , a 1 , a 3 , a 4 ), and verify that p is the outcome of both runs. In contrast, p is not pareto optimal in the third layer since it admits a self loop among a 2 and b 4 (b 4 is available and is preferred by a 2 over its assigned item b 2 ). Furthermore, assignment p is not pareto optimal in the fourth layer because it admits a trading cycle (a 1 , b 1 , a 3 , b 3 , a 2 , b 2 ) (see Figure 1 ): if a 1 , a 2 and a 3 trade their items, we get a new assignment q in which a 1 gets b 3 , a 2 gets b 1 , and a 3 gets b 2 ; assignment q pareto dominates p in the fourth layer, and we can verify that it is also pareto optimal in this layer. Fig. 1 The trading graph with respect to p in the fourth layer, where p admits the trading cycle (
Parameterized Complexity. Let Π be an NP-hard problem. In the framework of Parameterized Complexity, each instance of Π is associated with a parameter k. Here, the goal is to confine the combinatorial explosion in the running time of an algorithm for Π to depend only on k. Formally, we say that Π is
, where f is an arbitrary computable function of k. A weaker request is that for every fixed k, the problem Π would be solvable in polynomial time. Formally, we say that Π is slice-wise polynomial (XP) if any instance
, where f and g are arbitrary computable functions of k. Nowadays, Parameterized Complexity supplies a rich toolkit to design FPT and XP algorithms. Parameterized Complexity also provides methods to show that a problem is unlikely to be FPT. The main technique is the one of parameterized reductions analogous to those employed in classical complexity. Here, the concept of W[1]hardness replaces the one of NP-hardness, and for reductions we need not only construct an equivalent instance in FPT time, but also ensure that the size of the parameter in the new instance depends only on the size of the parameter in the original one. Definition 2.8. (Parameterized Reduction) Let Π and Π be two parameterized problems. A parameterized reduction from Π to Π is an algorithm that, given an instance (I, k) of Π, outputs an instance (I , k ) of Π such that:
If there exists such a reduction transforming a problem known to be W[1]hard to another problem Π, then the problem Π is W[1]-hard as well. Central W[1]-hard-problems include, for example, deciding whether a nondeterministic single-tape Turing machine accepts within k steps, Clique parameterized be solution size, and Independent Set parameterized by solution size. To show that a problem Π is not XP unless P=NP, it is sufficient to show that there exists a fixed k such Π is NP-hard. Then, the problem is said to be para-NPhard.
A companion notion to that of fixed-parameter tractability is the one of a polynomial kernel. Formally, a parameterized problem Π is said to admit a polynomial compression if there exists a (not necessarily parameterized) problem Π and a polynomial-time algorithm that given an instance (I, k) of Π, outputs an equivalent instance I of Π (that is, (I, k) is a Yes-instance of Π if and only if I is a Yes-instance of Π ) such that |I | ≤ p(k) where p is some polynomial that depends only on k. In case Π = Π, we further say that Π admits a polynomial kernel. For more information on Parameterized Complexity, we refer the reader to recent books such as [12, 11, 13] .
Non-Existence of a Polynomial Compression. Our proof of the "unlikely existence" of a polynomial kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment relies on the well-known notion of cross-composition, defined as follows. Definition 2.9 (Cross-Composition). A (not parameterized) problem Π cross-composes into a parameterized problem Π if there exists a polynomialtime algorithm, called a cross-composition, that given instances I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I t of Π for some t ∈ N that are of the same size s for some s ∈ N, outputs an instance (I, k) of Π such that the following conditions are satisfied.
• k ≤ p(s + log t) for some polynomial p.
and only if at least one of the instances
Proposition 2.10 ( [6, 7] ). Let Π be an NP-hard (not parameterized) problem that cross-composes into a parameterized problem Π . Then, Π does not admit a polynomial compression, unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
To obtain (essentially) tight conditional lower bounds for the running times of algorithms, we rely on the well-known Exponential-Time Hypothesis (ETH) [15, 16, 9] . To formalize the statement of ETH, first recall that given a formula ϕ in conjuctive normal form (CNF) with n variables and m clauses, the task of CNF-SAT is to decide whether there is a truth assignment to the variables that satisfies ϕ. In the p-CNF-SAT problem, each clause is restricted to have at most p literals. ETH asserts that 3-CNF-SAT cannot be solved in time O(2 o(n) ).
NP Hardness
Theorem 1. For any 2 ≤ α ≤ , Globally Optimal Assignment is NPhard.
Proof. We rely on a reduction made by Aziz et al. [5] from the Serial Dictatorship Feasibility problem, which was proved to be NP-hard by Saban and Sethuraman [20] . In the Serial Dictatorship Feasibility problem, the input is a tuple (A, I, P, a, b) where A is a set of n agents, I is a set of n items, P is the preference profile in which each agent has a complete linear order on the items, a ∈ A, and b ∈ I. The task is to decide whether there exists a permutation for which serial dictatorship (defined in Section 2) allocates item b to agent a. Given such (A, I, P, a, b), Aziz et al. [5] constructed two preference profiles, P 1 and P 2 , such that (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance if and only if there exists an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P 1 and P 2 .
Let (A, I, P, a, b) be an instance of Serial Dictatorship Feasibility. We construct the aforementioned preference profiles P 1 and P 2 . We also add additional − α new items c 1 , . . . , c −α , and define I = I ∪ {c 1 , . . . , c −α }. We construct − α preference profiles P 1 , . . . , P −α , where for each i ∈ [ − α], P i is defined as follows:
In other words, the only item that agent a accepts in P i is c i , and for each a ∈ A \ {a}, a accepts no items. We construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment with the agent set A, and the item set I , consisting of layers. The first two layers contain the preference profiles P 1 and P 2 , the next α − 2 layers contain copies of P 1 , and the next − α layers contain P 1 , . . . , P −α . Let us first prove the following. Claim 3.1. Let p be an α-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance. Then p is pareto optimal in P 1 and P 2 .
Proof. Note that the only pareto optimal assignment for P i is the assignment that allocates c i to a, and b ∅ to each a ∈ A \ {a}. Hence, there does not exist an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P i and P j when i = j. Moreover, there does not exist an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P i and P 1 or in both P i and P 2 since c i is not acceptable by a in P 1 as well as P 2 . The only possible option is that p is pareto optimal in the first α layers, then we have that p is pareto optimal in both P 1 and P 2 . ♦
We claim that there exists an α-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance if and only if (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance.
(⇒): Suppose there exists an α-globally optimal assignment p for the constructed instance. By Claim 3.1, p is pareto optimal in both P 1 and P 2 . By Aziz et al. [5] , this implies that (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance.
(⇐): Assume that (A, I, P, a, b) is a Yes-instance. By Aziz et al. [5] , there exists an assignment p that is pareto optimal in both P 1 and P 2 . By the construction of the instance, p is pareto optimal in the first α layers, hence p is α-globally optimal for the constructed instance.
Corollary 3.2. Globally Optimal Assignment is para-NP-hard for the parameter + α.
In contrast to Theorem 1, we mention that it is impossible to obtain the same hardness result when α = 1.
Observation 3.3. Globally Optimal Assignment is solvable in a polynomial time when α = 1.
Proof. We can simply find a pareto optimal assignment for the first layer using Corollary 2.6.
Before we continue with our next results, let us discuss a simple property that will help in many of our proofs. Definition 3.4. Let (A, I, P ) be an instance of the Assignment problem and suppose that P = {< a | a ∈ A}. We say that agents a 1 , a 2 ∈ A respect each other if there exists a linear order on a subset of I,
Lemma 3.5. Let (A, I, P ) be an instance of the Assignment problem, such that there exist some agents a 1 , . . . , a r ∈ A such that for each i, j ∈ [r], a i and a j respect each other. Then, for every assignment p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ }, p does not admit a trading cycle among the agents a 1 , . . . , a r .
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist an assignment p which admits a trading cycle (a 1 , p(a 1 ), . . . , a r , p(a r )) (notice that r ≥ 2). Since a 1 , . . . , a r pairwise respect each other, there exists a linear order
. . . p(a r ). Since p(a r ) < ar p(a 1 ), we have that p(a r ) p(a 1 ), a contradiction to being a linear order.
We define three constructions of preference profiles given an instance of 3-SAT and we prove interesting properties regarding them. We will rely on these in the design of a polynomial reduction from 3-SAT to Globally Optimal Assignment that shows that Globally Optimal Assignment is para-NPhard with respect to the parameter + α + d (where d is the maximal length of a preference list). We will also rely on these results in the design of our crosscompositions, which prove that Globally Optimal Assignment does not admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameters #agents + #items + α, #agents + #items + ( − α), and #items + unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
Let n, m ∈ N be positive integers. We use the notation A(m, n) to refer to the agent set A(m, n)
, j ∈ [n]}, and we use the notation I(m, n) to refer to the the item set I(m, n)
We will define two preference profiles over A(m, n) and I(m, n): P 1 (m, n) and P 2 (m, n). Intuitively, given a 3-SAT instance with n variables and m clauses, we will construct the sets A(m, n) and I(m, n), which contain two agents and two items for each clausevariable pair. The way that these agents and items are assigned to each other in an assignment that is pareto optimal in both P 1 (m, n) and P 2 (m, n) will encode a boolean assignment for the variable set of the instance. We define the preference profile P 1 (m, n) as follows.
, the trading graph of P 1 (m, n) with respect to p contains one of these two sub-graphs.
then at least one of the items b i,j , b i,j does not have an owner; this implies that at least one of the agents a i,j , a i,j admits a self loop, a contradiction to Proposition 2.3 (see Figure 2 ).
. Observe that the agents in A(m, n) pairwise respect each other in P 1 (m, n); then, by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycles in P 1 (m, n). Since p allocates all the items, it also does not admit self loops. Thus, by Proposition 2.3, p is pareto optimal in P 1 (m, n).
We now define the second preference profile P 2 (m, n) over A(m, n) and I(m, n). Intuitively, being pareto optimal in both P 1 (m, n) and P 2 (m, n) requires the agents to "agree" with each other. That is, a i1,j gets b i1,j if an only if a i2,j gets b i2,j for each i 1 = i 2 . For j ∈ [n], we denote the sets P true j , and P false j by P true
Informally speaking, P true j and P false j will correspond to setting the variable x j to true or false, respectively.
Example of the trading graph for the first case.
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in both P 1 (m, n) and P 2 (m, n). Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists j ∈ [n] satisfying that both P true j p and P false
Then we have that p admits the trading cycle (a i,j , b i,j , a i+1,j , b i+1,j ) in P 2 (m, n), a contradiction. For the second case, we have that there exists i ∈ [m] such that
(⇐): Assume that for each j ∈ [n], either P true j ⊆ p or P false j ⊆ p. By Claim 3.6, p is pareto optimal in P 1 (m, n). Then by the construction of P 2 (m, n), observe that every possible trading cycle in P 2 (m, n) has one of the forms:
. , x n } is the set of variables, and C = {C 1 , . . . , C m } is the set of clauses, each of size 3. In order to construct the third preference profile P 3 (D), order the literals in each clause arbitrarily, such that
. The third preference profile is responsible for the satisfiability of the formula. Let us define the following:
as the index of the variable which appears in the j-th literal in C i for each j ∈ [3] .
Briefly put, each assignment p that is pareto optimal in the profiles P 1 (m, n),P 2 (m, n), and P 3 (D) contains either P true
there exists at least one satisfied literal j i . Being pareto optimal in P 3 (D) enforces a i,indi (1) , a i,indi (2) and a i,indi (3) to admit a trading cycle if none of their corresponding literals is satisfied. We define the following:
is defined as follows:
such that x j does not appear in C i Claim 3.10. An assignment p : A(m, n) → I(m, n) ∪ {b ∅ } is pareto optimal in P 1 (m, n), P 2 (m, n), and P 3 (D) if and only if:
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P 1 (m, n), P 2 (m, n), and P 3 (D). Claim 3.7 implies that p satisfies the first condition. We show that p also satisfies the second condition: Observe that every tuple of the form Figure 4 ). Then by Proposition 2.3,
(⇐): Assume that p satisfies both conditions. By Claim 3.7, p is pareto optimal in both P 1 (m, n) and P 2 (m, n). We claim that p is also pareto optimal in P 3 (D): First, p does not admit self loops in P 3 (D) since all the
If p is pareto optimal in both P 1 (m, n) and P 2 (m, n), then every potential trading cycle in P 3 (D) has this form; and it occurs when
items are allocated. Second, observe that every trading cycle in 1) ). By the second condition (in each clause there exists at least one "satisfied" literal), p does not allow cycles of such form. Thus, we conclude that p pareto optimal in P 3 (D).
Then, there exists a boolean assignment ϕ : X → {T, F } that satisfies every clause in C. We construct an assignment p :
to p, and otherwise, we add P false j to p. We claim that p is pareto optimal in all three preference profiles. First, by Claim 3.7, p is pareto optimal in P 1 (m, n) and in P 2 (m, n). Second, it is pareto optimal in the third layer: Since ϕ satisfies every clause, we have that for each
By the definition of b D (i, j) and the construction of p, we have that p(a i,j ) = b D (i, j), and by Claim 3.10, p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D).
(⇐): Assume that there exists an assignment p that is pareto optimal in P 1 (m, n), P 2 (m, n) and P 3 (D). By Claim 3.10, for each j ∈ [n], either P true j ⊆ p or P false j ⊆ p. We define a boolean assignment for (X , C) by ϕ(
Hence, ϕ satisfies each clause in C, and therefore D is a Yes-instance.
We rely on these results to design a polynomial reduction from 3-SAT to Globally Optimal Assignment.
Theorem 2. 3-SAT is polynomial-time reducible to Globally Optimal
Assignment where α = = 3, and the maximal length of a preference list is d = 4.
Proof. Given an instance D = (X , C) of 3-SAT, such that |X | = n, and |C| = m, we construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment with the agent set A(m, n), and the item set I(m, n), consisting of 3 layers. The first layer contains P 1 (m, n), the second contains P 2 (m, n), and the third contains P 3 (D), and we finally set α = = 3. The reduction clearly can be done in polynomial time. The correctness of the reduction is derived by Lemma 3.11, which implies that there exists a 3-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance if and only if D is a Yes-instance.
Since +α+d in the statement above is upper bounded by a fixed constant, we conclude the following. 
Kernelization
We first give a simple lemma that will help us to design a polynomial kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment with respect to the parameter #agents+ . Lemma 4.1. Let (A, I, P ) be an instance of the Assignment problem where |A| = n. Then, for any agent a ∈ A and pareto optimal assignment, a is assigned to b ∅ or to one of the n most preferred items in its preference list.
Proof. Let p be a pareto optimal assignment for (A, I, P ). By Proposition 2.5, there exists a permutation π = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) on A such that applying serial dictatorship with respect to π results in p. Let i ∈ [n]. When the mechanism is in the i-th step, it has already allocated at most i − 1 items from I to agents a 1 , . . . , a i−1 . Hence, p(a i ) = b ∅ , or p(a i ) is the most preferred item of a i among the remaining items in its preference list, and is ranked at position j ≤ i ≤ n. Theorem 3. Globally Optimal Assignment admits a kernel of size O( n 2 ) where n = #agents.
Proof. Given an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment I 1 = (A, I, P 1 , . . . , P , α), the kernel reduces each preference profile P i to a preference profile P i by keeping only the n first-ranked items in each preference list (shown in Figure 5 ). Let I be a set containing the items ranked in the first n positions in some preference list in I 1 ; then, |I | ≤ n 2 . The resulting instance is I 2 = (A, I , P 1 , . . . , P , α), and it satisfies |I 2 | = O( n 2 ). We claim that an assignment p is α-globally optimal for the instance I 1 if and only if it is α-globally optimal for the instance I 2 . a 1 : a 2 : a n : (⇒) Let p be an α-globally optimal assignment for I 1 ; then, there exist α layers i 1 , . . . , i α , such that for each j ∈ [α], p is pareto optimal in P ij . By Lemma 4.1, each agent a ∈ A is assigned an item that appears in the first n items in its preference list in each P ij . Hence, p assigns an acceptable item to a in each P ij . Moreover, it is pareto optimal in each P ij , as otherwise, it would contradict p's optimality in each P ij .
(⇐) Let p be an α-globally optimal assignment for I 2 . Then by Proposition 2.5, there exist α profile-permutation pairs (P i1 , π 1 ), . . . , (P iα , π α ), such that for each j ∈ [α], applying serial dictatorship on profile P ij with respect to π j results in p. Observe that applying serial dictatorship on each P ij with respect to the same permutation π j results also in p. Therefore, by Proposition 2.5, p is also α-globally optimal for I 1 . Before we present a double-exponential kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment with respect to the parameter k = #items + , let us define the following. Proof. Given an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment Q = (A, I, P 1 , . . . , P , α), the kernelization algorithm works as follows (formally described in Algorithm 1): It removes from A agents which share the same agent class together with all their preference lists, such that in the resulting instance there will be at most m + 1 agents in the set A (C(a, Q) , Q), for each a ∈ A. Intuitively, the idea behind the correctness is that since there are m items, at most m agents in A (C(a, Q) , Q) will be assigned to items; we keep at most m + 1 agents (rather than m) in each agent class to cover the case where an agent is assigned to b ∅ and admits a self-loop. The kernelization algorithm clearly runs in a polynomial time. Assume that we run the kernel on I 1 = (A 1 , I, P 1 , . . . , P , α) to obtain an instance I 2 = (A 2 , I, Q 1 , . . . , Q , α). We first observe the following: ♦
We now prove that I 1 is a Yes-instance if and only if I 2 is a Yes-instance. (⇒): Assume that there exists an α-globally optimal assignment p for I 1 . Then, there exist α layers i 1 , . . . , i α of I 1 in which p is pareto optimal. We create an assignment q : A 2 → I ∪ {b ∅ } for the reduced instance as follows: For each a ∈ A 2 , let p(A 1 (C(a, I 1 ), I 1 )) denote the set of items allocated to the agents from A 1 (C(a, I 1 ), I 1 ) by p. We allocate the items in p(A 1 (C(a, I 1 ), I 1 )) to agents in A 2 (C(a, I 2 ), I 2 ) arbitrarily (observe that C(a, I 1 ) = C(a, I 2 )). Agents that do not have available items are assigned to b ∅ . First, we claim that q does not admit self loops in these layers. Observe that q allocates all the items which are allocated by p, since there are at most m items, and the algorithm keeps all or exactly m + 1 agents from each set A 1 (C(a, I 1 ), I 1 ). As a result, q cannot admit self loops in layers i 1 , . . . , i α of I 2 since if there exists a self loop in the new instance with agent a 2 ∈ A 2 , then there is an agent a 1 ∈ A 1 with the same agent class as a 2 , that admits a self loop in I 1 . Formally, the sets A 1 (C(a, I 1 ), I 1 ) and A 2 (C(a, I 2 ), I 2 ) satisfy |A 2 (C(a, I 2 ), I 2 )| ≤ |A 1 (C(a, I 1 ), I 1 )|. Since the agents in these sets are allocated the same number of items by p and q, if there exists an agent in A 2 (C(a, I 2 ), I 2 ) that admits a self loop in I 2 , there must exist an agent in A 1 (C(a, I 1 ) , I 1 ) that admits a self loop in I 1 . Second, we claim that q does not admit trading cycles in these layers. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists a layer i j in I 2 , and t agents a 1 , . . . , a t ∈ A 2 that admit a trading cycle (a 1 , p(a 1 ), . . . , a t , p(a t )) in Q ij . By the construction of q, observe that there exist t agents a 1 , . . . , a t ∈ A, such that for each i ∈ [t], C(a i , I 1 ) = C(a i , I 2 ), and q(a i ) = p(a i ). Then, p admits the trading cycle (a 1 , p(a 1 ), . . . , a t , p(a t )) in P ij . This gives a contradiction to Proposition 2.3.
(⇐): Assume that there exists an α-globally optimal assignment q for I 2 . Then there exist α layers i 1 , . . . , i α in I 2 in which q is pareto optimal. We denote an assignment p for I 1 by p(a) = q(a) a ∈ A 2 b ∅ otherwise , and we claim that p is pareto optimal in layers i 1 , . . . , i α in I 1 . By the construction of p, for each a 1 ∈ A 1 \ A 2 , there exists an agent a 2 ∈ A 2 such that C(a 1 , I 1 ) = C(a 2 , I 2 ) and p(a 1 ) = q(a 2 ). Namely, there exists a mapping f between agents in A 1 to agents in A 2 such that for each a 1 ∈ A 1 , C(a 1 , I 1 ) = C(f (a 1 ), I 2 ) and p(a 1 ) = q(f (a 1 )).
If p admits a trading cycle (a 1 , p(a 1 ), . . . , a r , p(a r )) in some layer i j of I 1 , then q admits the trading cycle (f (a 1 ), q(f (a 1 )), . . . , f (a r ), q(f (a r ))) in layer i j of I 2 . If p admits a self loop in layer i j of I 1 with agent a 1 ∈ A 1 , then q admits a self loop with agent f (a 1 ) in layer i j of I 2 . Thus by Proposition 2.3, we conclude that p is α-globally optimal in I 1 . Before we present our next results, let us provide the following observation on which we will rely in the next 3 cross-compositions. Proof. Since D has size n, it has at most n variables and at most n clauses. Then there exists a one to one mapping from X to X U . We pick such arbitrary mapping and replace each variable in D with its corresponding variable in X U . We then append the clause set with copies of some existing clause until it has size n, and denote the resulting clause multi-set by C U . The new instance U = (X U , C U ) is clearly equivalent to D.
Theorem 5. There does not exist a polynomial kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment with respect to the parameters k 1 = #agents + #items + α and k 2 = #agents + #items + ( − α), unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
Proof. We provide two cross-compositions from 3-SAT to Globally Optimal Assignment. Given instances of 3-SAT D 1 = (X 1 , C 1 ), . . . , D t = (X t , C t ) of the same size n ∈ N for some t ∈ N, we first modify each instance D i to have X i = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and |C i | = n using Observation 4.6. The two algorithms construct instances of Globally Optimal Assignment with 2n 2 + 2 log t agents, 2n 2 + 2 log t items, and 2 + t layers, that share the same agent set and item set (Shown in Figure 6 ). We first provide the first two layers, which are identical in both constructions, and then we provide the remaining t layers for each construction separately. We create the agent sets
Both constructions are defined over the agent set A = A(m, n) ∪ A t and the item set I = I(m, n) ∪ I t . Intuitively, we use A(m, n) and I(m, n) in order to construct the preference profiles P 1 (m, n), P 2 (m, n) and P 3 (D i ) for each i ∈ [t]. The agents from A t "choose" a Yes-instance (if one exists) from D 1 , . . . , D t ; their goal is to enforce an assignment to be pareto optimal in (at most) one profile among P 3 (D 1 ), . . . , P 3 (D t ).
The first layer is a composition of P 1 (n, n) with additional 2 log t preference lists that belong to the agents from A t and is defined as follows:
The second layer consists of the preference profile P 2 (n, n) together with the same preferences of the agents from A t as in the first layer: Fig. 6 The first two layers are identical in both cross compositions; P default (At) is the preference profile in which both c i and c i have the preference list
The first layer is a composition of P 1 (n, n) and P default (At), and the second layer is a composition of P 2 (n, n) and P default (At). The rest t layers will be defined separately for each parameter.
We also denote M 0
Informally speaking, the sets M 0 j and M 1 j will correspond to the value of the j-th bit in the binary representation of i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance. The sets M b j that are contained in a pareto optimal assignment will "encode" the index of some Yes-instance (if one exists). For each i ∈ N, j ∈ [ log i ], we define i[j] as the j-th bit in the binary representation of i, i.e. i = i [1] 
j . We first claim the following. Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in both layers. Since P 1 (n, n) is contained in the first layer, p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n). Similarly, p is pareto optimal in P 2 (n, n) since P 2 (n, n) is contained in the second layer. Observe that for each i ∈ [ log t ], d i and d i are both acceptable by c i and c i ; and are the only items acceptable by them. Then, we have that {p(c i ), p(c i )} = {d i , d i } (else we get a self loop), implying that for each j ∈ [ log t ], either M 0
Let i ∈ N be a number whose binary representation is i = i [1] . . . i[ log t ]; then, we have that M i ⊆ p. We prove that i is unique. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exists e ∈ [t] such that e = i and p satisfies that both M i ⊆ p and M e ⊆ p. Since e = i, there exists a place in their binary representations where they differ, i.e. there exists r ∈ [ log t ] such that e[r] = i[r]. Thus, both M 0 r ⊆ p and M 1 r ⊆ p, and this gives us a contradiction.
(⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in both P 1 (n, n) and P 2 (n, n), and there exists exactly one i ∈ [t] such that M i ⊆ p. First, we prove that p is pareto optimal in the first layer: Observe that all the agents pairwise respect each other in the first layer; then, by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycles in this layer. Moreover, by Claim 3.6, p allocates all the items, hence it does not admit self loops. Thus, Proposition 2.3 implies that p is pareto optimal in the first layer. Second, we prove that p is pareto optimal in the second layer: Observe that the agents from A t respect each other in the second layer; then by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycles among them. Furthermore, notice that the set of items acceptable by the agents from A(n, n) is disjoint from the set of items acceptable by the agents from A t , thus p cannot admit trading cycles that consist of both agents from A t and agents from A(n, n). Lastly, since p is pareto optimal in P 2 (n, n), Proposition 2.3 implies that it does not admit trading cycles among agents from A(n, n). Then, we have by Proposition 2.3 that p is pareto optimal in the second layer. ♦
We define the remaining t layers separately for each construction.
The parameter k = #agents + #items + α. The cross composition for this parameter constructs layer 2 + i as a composition of P 3 (D i ) with a unique combination of preference lists of length 1 that belong to agents from A t . It is defined as follows:
An illustration of the last t layers in shown in Figure 7 .Intuitively, the goal of the agents from A t is to enforce each assignment to be pareto optimal in at most one layer among 3, . . . , t. We finally set α = 3. Note that the construction can be done in time that is polynomial in Σ t i=1 |D i |. Before we prove the correctness of the construction, let us prove the following: . . . . . . Fig. 7 The last t layers constructed for the parameter #agents+#items+α. An assignment can be pareto optimal in at most one layer among layers 3, . . . , t. If p is a 3-globally optimal assignment, then the layer 2 + i in which it is pareto optimal corresponds to a Yes-instance Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. First, since P 3 (D i ) is contained in the preference profile of layer 2 + i, we infer that p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ). Second, observe that for each i ∈ (⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ) and that M i ⊆ p. Notice that p allocates all the items, thus it cannot admit self loops in layer 2 + i. In addition, since each agent from A t only accepts a single item, p cannot admit trading cycles among agents from A t . Moreover, since P 3 (D i ) is contained in the preference profile in layer 2 + i, and p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ), by Proposition 2.3 we have that p does not admit trading cycles among agents from A(n, n). We have also that p does not admit trading cycles that contain both agents from A t and agents from A(n, n) since their sets of acceptable items are disjoint. Then we infer that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. ♦ Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist i 1 , i 2 ∈ [t] such that i 1 = i 2 and p is pareto optimal in both layers 2 + i 1 and 2 + i 2 . By Claim 4.9, both M i1 ⊆ p and M i2 ⊆ p, a contradiction to Claim 4.8. ♦
We now prove that there exists i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance of 3-SAT if and only if there exists a 3-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Assume there exists i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance. By Lemma 3.11, there exists an assignment p that is pareto optimal in the profiles P 1 (n, n), P 2 (n, n) and P 3 (D i ). We extend p by p ← p ∪ M i . Since p allocates all the items from I, it is pareto optimal in the first two layers by Claim 4.8. By Claim 4.9, it is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. Thus, p is 3-globally optimal for the constructed instance.
(⇐): Suppose there exists a 3-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance. By Claim 4.10, p is pareto optimal in at most one among layers 3, . . . , t, say, layer 2 + i where i ∈ [t]. By Claim 4.9, p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ) and by Claim 4.8, it is pareto optimal in both P 1 (n, n) and P 2 (n, n). Thus we have by Lemma 3.11 that D i is a Yes-instance.
Since the constructed instance satisfies #agents + #items + α = O(n 2 + log t), Proposition 2.10 implies that Globally Optimal Assignment does not admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter k = #agents + #items + α, unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
The parameter k = #agents + #items + ( − α). Similarly to the previous cross composition, the goal of the agents in A t here is to encode some i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance (if one exists). This is done by enforcing every -pareto optimal assignment to be pareto optimal in some profile P 3 (D i ) and preventing the existence of trading cycles in all layers 2 + j where j = i. Let i ∈ [t], we define layer 2 + i as follows:
The construction is illustrated in Figure 8 . We now claim the following. Claim 4.11. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment such that p is pareto optimal in the first two layers and let i ∈ [t]. Then p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i if and only if: (1) p allocates all the items in I, and (2) M i p or p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. By Claim 4.8, p is pareto optimal in both P 1 (n, n) and P 2 (n, n) and there exists exactly one j ∈ [t] such that M j ⊆ p. By the construction of the first layer, p must allocate all the items since otherwise it would admit self loops. Notice that the only possible trading cycle in layer 2 + i, for any i ∈ [t], has the form: 1) . . . . . .
Layer 2+t
P 3 (D t ) Q(A t , t) . . . . . . . . .
Layer 2+i
. . . Fig. 8 The last t layers constructed for the parameter #agents + #items + ( − α). Q(At, i) consists of the preference lists of the agents from At in layer 2 + i, for each i ∈ [t]. All the possible cycles in layers 3, . . . , t can be decomposed into a path with 3 items in the trading graph of P 3 (D i ), connected to a path with log t items in the trading graph of Q(At, i), and an edge connecting the end point of the second path to the start point of the first path. For an -globally optimal assignment, the second path will be cut in most layers, then no cycles will exist. There will exist exactly one layer 2 + i for which the trading graph of Q(At, i) contains such path. This implies that the trading graph of P 3 (D i ) must not contain paths with 3 items, then D i is a Yes-instance.
, b Di (q, 1), c log t , d( log t , i[ log t ]), . . . , c 1 , d(1, i[1] )) and it exists only when p is not pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ) and M i ⊆ p. (⇐): Suppose that p satisfies that M i p or p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ). By the observation in the previous direction, p does not admit trading cycles in layer 2 + i. Thus, p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. ♦
We prove that there exists i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance if and only if there exists an -globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Suppose there exists i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance. We extend p by p ← p ∪ M i . By Lemma 3.11, p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n), P 2 (n, n) and P 3 (D i ). First, since all the items in I t are allocated, by Claims 4.9 and 4.10 we have that p is pareto optimal in the first two layers. Second, by Claim 4.11, we have that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + i. Third, let j ∈ [t] \ {i}. By the construction of p we have that M j p, then by Claim 4.11, p is pareto optimal in layer 2 + j. Then we conclude that p is -globally optimal for the constructed instance.
(⇐): Suppose that there exists an -globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance p. By Claims 4.9 and 4.10, p is pareto optimal in both P 1 (n, n) and P 2 (n, n) and there exists i ∈ [t] such that M i ⊆ p. Claim 4.11 implies that p is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ). Thus, by Lemma 3.11, D i is a Yes-instance.
We show the the same result holds also for the parameter #items + . Theorem 6. There does not exist a polynomial kernel for Globally Optimal Assignment with respect to k = #items + , unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
Proof. We present a cross-composition from 3-SAT to Globally Optimal Assignment. Given instances of 3-SAT D 1 = (X 1 , C 1 ), . . . , D t = (X t , C t ) of the same size n ∈ N for some t ∈ N, we first modify each instance D i to have X i = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and |C i | = n using Observation 4.6. We define an agent set A i (n, n) of n 2 agents for each instance D i by A i (n, n) = {a i r,j , a i r,j | r, j ∈ [n]} and we set A = t i=1 A i (n, n). We also create the item set I = I(n, n) . The constructed instance is defined over A and I, and it consists of 2 log t + 2 layers. Notice that we have a total number of 2tn 2 agents and 2n 2 items, then in every assignment for the constructed instance, there will exist agents which get no items. Intuitively, the goal of the first 2 log t layers is to enforce every α-globally optimal assignment to allocate the items in I only to agents that correspond to a Yes-instance (if one exists). They are constructed as compositions the profile P 1 (n, n) over the agent set A i (n, n) and the item set I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t] (namely, replacing each a q,j with a i q,j in P 1 (n, n)). Layer 2 log t +1 is constructed as a composition of the profile P 2 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t], and the last layer is a composition of the profiles P 3 (D i ) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t]. We first construct the first log t layers. Informally speaking, for i ∈ [ log t ], the preference profile in layer i requires an assignment to allocate b ∅ to any agent whose corresponding instance is D j such that the i-th bit in the binary representation of j is 0. Layer i is formally defined as follows:
We define the next log t layers. Intuitively, layer log i +i is different from layer i such that it requires an assignment to allocate b ∅ to any agent whose corresponding instance is D j such that the i-th bit in the binary representation of j is 1 (instead of 0). For each i ∈ [ log t ], layer log t +i is defined as follows:
Layer 2 log t + 1 is a composition of the profile P 2 (n, n) over the agent set A i (n, n) and the item set I(n, n) for each i ∈ [t].
Layer 2 log t + 2 is a composition of the profiles P 3 (D i ) over A i (n, n) and Proof. We provide a proof for the first condition (the proof for the second is symmetric). (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer i. Since the preference lists of agents a r q,j and a r q,j for all q, j ∈ [n] and r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1 are empty, p allocates b ∅ to all such agents, and therefore allocates items only to agents from {a r q,j , a r q,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}. In addition, observe that each item in I is acceptable by at least two agents from the set {a r q,j , a r q,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}. By Proposition 2.3, p does not admit self loops. Thus we have that all the items in I are allocated.
(⇐): Suppose that p allocates all the items in I to agents from the set {a r q,j , a r q,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0}. First, since p allocates all the items, it does not admit self loops in layer i. Second, observe that all the agents pairwise respect each other in this layer, thus by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycle. By Proposition 2.3, p is pareto optimal in layer i. ♦ Claim 4.13. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment for the constructed instance. Then there does not exist i ∈ log t such that p is pareto optimal in both layers i and log t + i.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exists i ∈ log t such that p is pareto optimal in both layers i and log t +i. By Claim 4.12, p allocates all the items in I to agents from both {a r q,j , a r q,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 0} and {a r q,j , a r q,j | q, j ∈ [n], r ∈ [t] such that r[i] = 1}, but the intersection of these two sets is empty, a contradiction. ♦ Claim 4.14. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment for the constructed instance. Then p is pareto optimal in at most log t layers among the first 2 log t layers.
Proof. Claim 4.13 implies that for each i ∈ log t , p is pareto optimal in at most one among layers i and log t + i. Implying that p is pareto optimal in at most log t layers among the first 2 log t layers. ♦ Let i ∈ [t], and let p be an assignment for the constructed instance. We say that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers if it satisfies the following:
• For each j ∈ [ log t ] such that i[j] = 0, p is pareto optimal in layer j.
• For each j ∈ [ log t ] such that i[j] = 1, p is pareto optimal in layer log t + j. Proof. Since α = log t + 2, Claim 4.14 implies that p is pareto optimal in exactly log t layers among the first 2 log t layers. By Claim 4.13, for each j ∈ [ log t ], p is pareto optimal in either layer j or layer log t + j. Denote i[j] = 0 if p is pareto optimal in layer j and i[j] = 1 if p is pareto optimal in layer log t + j. Observe that p encodes i = i [1] i [2] . . . i[ log t ] in the first 2 log t layers. ♦ Claim 4.16. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment for the constructed instance. Then there exists i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers if and only if p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n) over the agent set A i (n, n) and the item set I(n, n).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that there exists i ∈ [t] that p encodes in the first 2 log t layers. Observe that for each j ∈ [ log t ], if i[j] = 0 then p is pareto optimal in layer j, and if i[j] = 1 then p is pareto optimal in layer log t + j. By Claim 4.12, p allocates all the items in I to agents from n) . Since the agents in A i (n, n) respect each other in P 1 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n), and all the items are allocated to A i (n, n), we have by Lemma 3.5 and Proposition 2.3 that p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n).
(⇐): Suppose that p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n). We claim that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers: By Claim 4.12, for each j ∈ [ log t ], if i[j] = 0 then p is pareto optimal in layer j, and if i[j] = 1 then p is pareo optimal in layer log t + j. Then we have that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers. ♦ Claim 4.17. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment such that there exists i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers. Then p is pareto optimal in layer 2 log t + 1 if and only if it is pareto optimal in P 2 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 log t +1. Since P 2 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n) is contained in the preference profile of layer 2 log t + 1, p must be pareto optimal in this sub-profile. (⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P 3 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n). By the construction of P 3 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n), p must allocate all the items to agents from A i (n, n), as otherwise, it would admit self loops. Observe that agents from A\A i (n, n) do not admit trading cycles since they are assigned to b ∅ , and they also do not admit self loops since all their acceptable items are already allocated by p. ♦ Claim 4.18. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment such that there exists i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers. Then p is pareto optimal in layer 2 log t + 2 if and only if it is pareto optimal in P 3 (D i ) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n).
Proof. (⇒): Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer 2 log t +2. Since P 3 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n) is contained in the preference profile of layer 2 log t + 1, p must be pareto optimal in this sub-profile. (⇐): Assume that p is pareto optimal in P 3 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n). By the construction of P 3 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n), p must allocate all the items to agents from A i (n, n), as otherwise, it would admit self loops.
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and I(n, n)
. . . . . . P 2 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n) Fig. 9 If p is ( log t + 2)-globally optimal for the constructed instance, then the log t layers in which it is pareto optimal among the first 2 log t layers encode i ∈ [t] such that:
(1) p allocates all the items from I(n, n) to all the agents from A i (n, n), and (2) p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n). We have that p must be pareto optimal in both layers 2 log t + 1 and 2 log t + 2, implying that it is pareto optimal in both P 2 (n, n) and P 3 (D i ) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n).
Observe that agents in A \ A i (n, n) do not admit trading cycles since they are assigned to b ∅ , they also do not admit self loops since all their acceptable items are already allocated by p. ♦
We now prove the correctness of the construction. Namely, there exists i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance of 3-SAT if and only if there exists an α-globally optimal for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Suppose there exists i ∈ [t] such that D i is a Yes-instance. By Lemma 3.11, there exists an assignment q : A(n, n) → I(n, n) ∪ {b ∅ } such that q is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n), P 2 (n, n) and P 3 (D i ). We define an assignment p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } by p(a i r,j ) = q(a r,j ), p(a i r,j ) = q(a r,j ) for each j, r ∈ [n], and p(a y r,j ) = b ∅ , p(a y r,j ) = b ∅ for each j, r ∈ [n], y ∈ [t] \ {i}. By Claims 4.12 and 4.14, we have that p is pareto optimal in exactly log t layers among the first 2 log t layers and that it encodes i. By Claims 4.17 and 4.18, p is pareto optimal in both layers 2 log t + 1 and 2 log t + 2. Thus, p is an α-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇐): Assume that there exists p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } that is α-globally optimal for the constructed instance (see Figure 9 ). By Claims 4.14 and 4.15, p is pareto optimal in exactly log t layers among the first 2 log t layers, and there exists i ∈ [t] such that p encodes i in the first 2 log t layers. By Claim 4.16, p is pareto optimal in P 1 (n, n) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n). Since p is α-globally optimal, it is pareto optimal in layers 2 log t + 1 and 2 log t + 2. Claims 4.17 and 4.18 imply that p is pareto optimal in both P 2 (n, n) and P 3 (D i ) over A i (n, n) and I(n, n). Hence, by Lemma 3.11, we have that D i is a Yes-instance.
Since the constructed instance satisfies #items + = O(n 2 + log(t)), we have by Proposition 2.10 that Globally Optimal Assignment does not admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter k = #items + , unless NP⊆coNP/poly.
Fixed-Parameter Tractability and ETH Based Lower Bounds
We prove that Globally Optimal Assignment is FPT with respect to the parameter k = #agents by presenting an algorithm with running time O * (k!). Furthermore, we prove that this is essentially the best possible running time for this parameter (and even for a larger parameter) under ETH.
Let us first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let (A, I, P 1 , . . . , P , α) be an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment, and let p be an assignment. Let G i denote the trading graph of P i with respect to p for each i ∈ [ ]. Then p is α-globally optimal for the instance if and only if there exists α trading graphs among G 1 . . . , G that contain no cycles.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that p is α-globally optimal. Then there exist α layers i 1 , . . . , i α such that for each j ∈ [α], p is pareto optimal in P ij . By Proposition 2.4, for each j ∈ [α], G ij does not contain cycles.
(⇐) Assume that there exist α layers i 1 , . . . , i α , such that for each j ∈ [α], G ij does not contain cycles. By Proposition 2.4, p is pareto optimal in each P ij , implying that it is α-globally optimal. Theorem 7. There exists an O * (n!) algorithm for Globally Optimal Assignment, where n = #agents.
Proof. We present a brute-force algorithm (described formally in Algorithm 2). The algorithm enumerates all possible pareto optimal assignments for each layer, using serial dictatorship. For each assignment, it constructs the corresponding trading graphs, and checks whether there exist α graphs with no cycles.
The running time of the algorithm is O * (n!), since it iterates over (n!) assignments, and for each assignment, it takes polynomial time to construct − 1 trading graphs, and to count how many of them contain no cycles.
Let us now prove that the algorithm returns "yes" if and only if the input is a Yes-instance.
(⇒) Suppose that the algorithm returns "yes". This implies that there exist a layer i ∈ [ ] and a permutation π on A, such that serial dictatorship on P i with respect to π produces an assignment p satisfying that there exist α − 1 graphs among the trading graphs of {P j | j ∈ [ ], j = i} with respect to p which do not contain cycles. By Proposition 2.5, p is pareto optimal in P i , input : An instance (A, I, P 1 , . . . , P , α) output: Does an α-globally optimal assignment exist?
foreach permutation π on A do apply serial dictatorship on profile P i with respect to π, to obtain an assignment p count ←− 1 foreach j ∈ [ ] \ {i} do G ←− P j 's trading graph with respect to p if G contains no cycles then count ←− count + 1 end end if count ≥ α then return "yes" end end end return "no" Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Globally Optimal Assignment. and by Lemma 5.1, it is pareto optimal in α − 1 preference profiles among {P j | j ∈ [ ], j = i}. This implies that p is α-globally optimal.
(⇐) Suppose we are dealing with a Yes-instance; then, there exists an assignment p, and α layers i 1 , . . . , i α in which p is pareto optimal. Proposition 2.5 implies that for each of these layers i j , there exists a permutation π j such that applying serial dictatorship on P ij with respect to π j results in p. Thus, when the algorithm reaches one of the layers i 1 , . . . , i α and its corresponding permutation for the first time, it generates p. By Lemma 5.1, the algorithm verifies correctly that it is α-globally optimal.
By Theorems 4 and 7, we conclude the following. We now prove that O * (k!) is a tight lower bound on the running time under ETH, even when k = #agents + #items + α, making the algorithm in Theorem 7 optimal. To prove this, we will need the following. Proposition 5.3 (Cygan et al. [11] ). Suppose that there is a polynomialtime parameterized reduction from problem A to problem B such that if the parameter of an instance of A is k, then the parameter of the constructed instance of B is at most g(k) for some nondecreasing function g. Then an O * (2 o(f (k)) )-time algorithm for B for some nondecreasing function f implies an O * (2 o (f (g(k) )) )-time algorithm for A. 
Fig. 10
For the presented graph, the constructed instance of Globally Optimal Assignment consists of 9 layers, one for each row-column pair; {(1, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)} is a 3 × 3permutation clique. Thus, the assignment p which satisfies p(a 1 ) = b 1 , p(a 2 ) = b 3 , and p(a 3 ) = b 2 is 3-globally optimal for the constructed instance, and is pareto optimal in the profiles P (1, 1) , P (2, 3) , and P (3, 2) . Proof. We provide a linear parameter reduction from k × k Permutation Clique. In the k × k Permutation Clique problem, we are given a graph G where the vertices are elements of a k × k table, namely,
Then, a k × k-permutation clique is a clique of size k in G that contains exactly one vertex from each row and exactly one vertex from each column. In other words, there exists a permutation π on [k] such that the vertices of the clique are (1, π(1)), . . . , (k, π(k)). The task is to decide whether there exists a k × k-permutation clique in G. Lokshtanov et al. [19] proved that there is no O * (2 o(k log k) )-time algorithm for k × k Permutation Clique, unless ETH fails. Let (G, k) be an instance of k × k Permutation Clique. We create an agent a i for each row i ∈ [k], and an item b j for each column j ∈ [k]. We construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment consisting of k 2 layers, each corresponds to a row-column pair (i, j), containing the preference profile P (i,j) defined as follows.
We finally set α = k. We prove now that there exists a k × k-permutation clique in G if and only if there exists a k-globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒) Suppose there exists a permutation π for [k] such that (1, π(1)), . . . , (k, π(k)) form a clique in G. We define an assignment p by p(a i ) = b π(i) for each i ∈ [k], and we claim that p is pareto optimal in each P (i,π(i)) (see Figure 10 ). Observe that for each i ∈ [k], b π(i) is acceptable by a i in P (i,π(i)) and in all profiles P (j,π(j)) such that j ∈ [k] \ {i} since there is an edge between (i, π(i)) and each (j, π(j)). Moreover, each P (j,π(j)) contains no self loops due to the fact that all the items are allocated. Since we sorted each preference list in an ascending order by the item indices, all the agents respect each other in each preference profile and by Lemma 3.5, p does not admit trading cycles in any layer.
(⇐) Suppose there exists a k-globally optimal assignment p for the constructed instance. Note that if p is pareto optimal in some profile P (i,j) , it must satisfy p(a i ) = b j , as otherwise, a i would admit a self loop (b j is not acceptable by any agent but a i in P (i,j) ). Hence, we have that for each i ∈ [k], p is pareto optimal in at most one profile among P (i,1) , . . . , P (i,k) and in at most one profile among P (1,i) , . . . , P (k,i) . Since we set α = k, we have that for each i ∈ [k], p is pareto optimal in exactly one profile among P (i,1) , . . . , P (i,k) and in exactly one profile among P (1,i) , . . . , P (k,i) . This implies that there exists a permutation π on [k] such that p is pareto optimal in P (i,π(i)) for each i ∈ [k]. We claim that {(i, π(i)) | i ∈ [k]} is the vertex set of a clique in G. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exist two different rows i 1 and i 2 such that {(i 1 , π(i 1 )), (i 2 , π(i 2 ))} / ∈ E(G). By the construction of the preference lists, observe that b π(i2) is not acceptable by a i2 in P (i1,π(i1)) . Therefore, p is not a legal assignment for P (i1,π(i1)) , a contradiction to its optimality.
It holds that #agents + #items + α = O(k). Thus, by Proposition 5.3, we conclude that there is no O * (2 o(k log k) )-time algorithm for Globally Optimal Assignment, unless ETH fails.
We now prove a that the same result holds also for the parameter #agents+ #items + ( − α). Theorem 9. Unless ETH fails, there does not exists an algorithm for Globally Optimal Assignment with running time O * (2 o(k log k) ), where k = #agents + #items + ( − α).
Proof. We provide a different linear parameter reduction from k×k Permutation Clique for the parameter #agents+#items+( −α). Let (G = (V, E), k) be an instance of k × k Permutation Clique (recall that V = [k] × [k]). We create 2k agents a 1 , . . . , a k , c 1 , . . . , c k , and 2k items b 1 , . . . , b k , d 1 , . . . , d k . Then, we construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment consisting of = 1 + k + k 2 2 − |E| layers as follows. Intuitively, the first layer requires the agents a 1 , . . . , a k to accept only the items b 1 , . . . , b k , and the agents c 1 , . . . , c k to accept only the items d 1 , . . . , d k . Formally, it is defined as follows:
The next k layers require a i and c i to "agree" with each other. Namely, p(a i ) = b j if and only if p(c i ) = d j . To this end, for each j ∈ [k], we construct the following preference profile:
We construct additional k 2 2 − |E| layers (notice that there are exactly k 2 2 − |E| pairs of vertices {(i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 )} that are not adjacent in G). Each layer is defined with respect to a vertex pair (i 1 , j 1 ) = (i 2 , j 2 ) such that {(i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 )} / ∈ E as follows:
Finally, we set α = . The reduction can be done in a polynomial time using simple polynomial-time operations on graphs. Before we prove the correctness of the construction, let us prove the following: Proof. Observe that in the first layer, b 1 , . . . , b k are all only acceptable by a 1 , . . . , a k and d 1 , . . . , d k are all only acceptable by c 1 , . . . , c k . Hence, p must allocate all the items. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists b j that is not assigned to any agent (the case when there exists d j that is not assigned to any agent is symmetric). This implies that there exists an agent a i that satisfies p(a i ) = b ∅ and therefore admits a self loop with b j , a contradiction to the optimality of p in the first layer. 
Proof. Observe that π is a well-defined permutation on [k] since p allocates all the items in {b 1 , . . . , b k }. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist different i 1 , i 2 ∈ [k] such that {(i 1 , π(i 1 )), (i 2 , π(i 2 ))} / ∈ E. First, by Claims 5.4 and 5.5, p(c i1 ) = d π(i1) and p(c i2 ) = d π(i2) . Second, by the construction of the instance, there exists a layer among the k 2 2 − |E| last layers which corresponds to the non-adjacent pair {(i 1 , π(i 1 )), (i 2 , π(i 2 )}. Note that p admits the trading cycle (a i1 , b π(i1) , c i2 , d π(i2) ) in this layer, a contradiction. ♦
We now prove that there exists a k × k-permutation clique in G if and only if there exists an -globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Let π be a permutation on [k] such that V = {(1, π(1)), . . . , (k, π(k))} is the vertex set of a k×k-permutation clique in G. Let us define an assignment p by p(a i ) = b π(i) , and p(c i ) = d π(i) for each i ∈ [k]. Observe that both {a 1 , . . . , a k } and {c 1 , . . . , c k } contain agents that pairwise respect each other. Since each d j is not acceptable by any a i , and each b j is not acceptable by any c i , we have by Lemma 3.5 that p does not admit trading cycles in the first layer. Moreover, since all the items are allocated, it does not admit self loops in the first layer, implying that p is pareto optimal in the this layer. Furthermore, p is also pareto optimal in the next k layers since a i and c i "agree" with each other for each i ∈ [k]. Formally, for every j ∈ [k], both {a 1 , . . . , a k } and {c 1 , . . . , c k } contain agents that pairwise respect each other in layer 1 + j. By the construction of layer 1 + j, and by Lemma 3.5, the only possible trading cycle in this layer occurs when p(a i ) = b j , and p(c i ) = d q such that q = j. We claim that p is also pareto optimal in the last k 2 2 − |E| layers. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a pair {(q 1 , r 1 ), (q 2 , r 2 )} / ∈ E, such that p is not pareto optimal in its corresponding layer. By Lemma 3.5, the only possible trading cycle in this layer is (a q1 , b r1 , c q2 , d r2 ). Thus, we have that p(a q1 ) = b r1 and p(c q2 ) = d r2 . By the construction of p, both (q 1 , r 1 ) and (q 2 , r 2 ) are vertices in V , a contradiction.
(⇐): Let p be an -globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance. By Claim 5.6, there exists a k × k-permutation clique in G. Proof. We present a simple brute-force algorithm. The algorithm simply iterates over all subsets of items I ⊆ I. For each subset, it iterates over all subsets A ⊆ A such that |A | = |I |. For each a / ∈ A , the algorithm allocates b ∅ , and it tries all possible |I |! different ways to allocate the items in I to the agents in A (it skips allocations that allocate items that are not acceptable by their owner in more than − α + 1 layers). The algorithm constructs the corresponding trading graphs, and verifies in polynomial time whether the current assignment is α-globally optimal. Hence, the running time of the algorithm is m t=0
Theorem 11. Globally Optimal Assignment is W[1]-hard for the parameter k = #items + α.
Proof. We provide a parameterized (and also polynomial time) reduction from the W[1]-hard problem Multicolored Independent Set to Globally Optimal Assignment. The input of Multicolored Independent Set consists of an undirected graph G = (V, E), and a coloring c : V → [k] that colors the vertices in V with k colors. The task is to decide whether G admits a multicolored independent set of size k, which is an independent set (i.e. a vertex subset with pair-wise non-adjacent vertices) V ⊆ V that satisfies
Given an instance (G = (V, E), c) of Multicolored Independent Set, denote V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. We construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment consisting of n layers, with agent set A = {a 1 , . . . , a n }, and item set I = {b 1 , . . . , b k }. Intuitively, each agent a i corresponds to the vertex v i , and each item b i corresponds to the color i ∈ [k]. We construct the instance such that the items are allocated to agents whose corresponding vertices form a multicolored independent set. For each i ∈ [n], we construct the preference profile in layer i, denoted by P i , as follows:
Finally, we set α = k. The construction clearly can be done in a polynomial time. Before we prove the correctness of the reduction, let us prove the following claim. Claim 5.7. Let p : A → I ∪ {b ∅ } be an assignment. Then for any i ∈ [n], if p is pareto optimal in layer i, then it satisfies that p(a i ) = b c(vi) , and for each
. Assume that p is pareto optimal in layer i. Note that a i is the only agent that accepts b c(vi) in P i and this is the only item it accepts. Hence, p must allocate b i to a i , as otherwise, a i would be a part of a self loop. Fig. 11 In the presented graph colored using 5 colors, {v 1 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 , v 6 } is a multicolored independent set of size 5. The contsructed instance contains 8 layers, one for each vertex; and the presented assignment is 5-globally optimal since it is pareto optimal in layers 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
We now prove that G admits a multicolored independent set of size k if and only if the constructed instance admits a k-globally optimal assignment.
(⇒) Assume that G admits a multicolored independent set V = {v i1 , . . . , v i k }. We define an assignment p by p(a ij ) = b c(vj ) for each j ∈ [k] (see Figure 11 ), and p(a i ) = b ∅ for each i / ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i k }. Note that the assignment does not assign the same item to two or more agents since the colors of the vertices in V are distinct. We claim that p is k-globally optimal for the constructed instance. First, the agents a i1 , . . . , a i k contain non-empty preference lists in the preference profiles P i1 , . . . , P i k since their corresponding vertices are pair-wise non-adjacent and colored with distinct colors. Hence, each item is acceptable by its owner in each P ij . Second, P i1 , . . . , P i k cannot include trading cycles since each preference list is of length at most one.
(⇐) Suppose there exists a k-globally optimal assignment p for the constructed instance. Then, there exist k layers i 1 , . . . , i k such that p is pareto optimal in each P ij . Proposition 5.7 implies that for each j ∈ [k], p(a ij ) = b c(vi j ) , and for each q ∈ [n] such that {v q , v j } ∈ E, p(a q ) = b ∅ . We claim that V = {v i1 , . . . , v i k } is a multicolored independent set. First, we show that it forms an independent set. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist j 1 , j 2 ∈ [k] such that {v ij 1 , v ij 2 } ∈ E. Then, the preference list of a ij 2 in P ij 1 is empty, and therefore p is not legal in P ij 1 , a contradiction to its pareto optimality in P ij 1 . Second, we show that it is multicolored. Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist j 1 , j 2 ∈ [k] such that c(v ij 1 ) = c(v ij 2 ). By Claim 5.7, since p is pareto optimal in layers i j1 and i j2 , it satisfies p(a ij 1 ) = b c(vi j 1 ) and p(a ij 2 ) = b c(vi j 1 ) . We have that p assigns b c(vi j 1 ) to two agents, a contradiction.
We now provide a similar hardness result for the parameter #items+( −α).
Theorem 12.
Globally Optimal Assignment is W[1]-hard for the parameter k = #items + ( − α).
Proof. We provide a different parameterized (and polynomial time) reduction from Multicolored Independent Set to Globally Optimal Assignment.
Given an instance (G = (V, E), c) of Multicolored Independent Set, assume that V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. We construct an instance of Globally Optimal Assignment with agent set A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } and item set I = {b 1 , . . . , b k }, consisting of = n+1 layers. Informally speaking, each agent a i corresponds to a vertex v i , and each item b i corresponds to a color i. We construct an instance such that the agents that allocate items from I in anglobally optimal assignment correspond to vertices which form a multicolored independent set in G. Moreover, we require each agent to allocate either the item that corresponds to its color with respect to c, or b ∅ . The first layer is defined as follows:
We construct n additional layers. For each i ∈ [n], layer 1 + i is defined as follows:
We finally set α = . We claim that G admits a multicolored independent set of size k if and only if there exists an -globally optimal assignment for the constructed instance.
(⇒): Suppose G admits a multicolored independent set of size k, V = {v i1 , . . . , v i k }. We define an assignment p by p(a ij ) = b c(vi j ) for each j ∈ [k], and p(a i ) = b ∅ for each i / ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i k }. We claim that p is pareto optimal in all the layers. First, observe that for each i ∈ [k], p(a i ) is acceptable by a i in each layer, and each layer cannot admit self loops since all the items are allocated. Second, p is pareto optimal in the first layer: since each agent accepts only a single item, no subset of agents can admit a trading cycle. Third, we claim that p is pareto-optimal in layer 1 + i for each i ∈ [n]. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists i ∈ [n] such that p is not pareto optimal in layer 1+i. By Proposition 2.3 there exists a trading cycle in layer 1 + i. Observe that a trading cycle in layer 1 + i cannot contain agents with a single item on their preference list. Moreover, it cannot contain only agents from {a j | {v i , v j } ∈ E and c(v j ) = c(v i )} since each such agent ranks b c(vi) first in its preference list. Therefore, we have that the only possible trading cycle in layer 1 + i consists of the agent a i and an agent a r such that p(a i ) = b c(vi) , c(v i ) = c(v r ), {v i , v r } ∈ E, and p(a r ) = b c(vr) . Then, by the construction of p, we have that v i , v r ∈ V , a contradiction.
(⇐): Suppose there exists an α-globally optimal assignment p for the constructed instance. We first show that p must allocate all the items. Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ [k] such that b j is not assigned to any agent. Since n ≥ k, there exists an agent a t that is not assigned to an item. Notice that a t accepts all the items in layer 1 + t, thus, a t and b j admit a self loop, a contradiction. Let a i1 , . . . , a i k denote the agents that are allocated an item from I. We claim that p(a ij ) = b c(vi j ) for each j ∈ [k]. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ [k] such that p(a ij ) = b c(vi j ) . We consider two cases: (1) p(a ij ) = b ∅ . In this case, p admits a self loop among a ij and b c(vi j ) in the first layer, a contradiction. (2) p(a ij ) = b r = b c(vi j ) . In this case, p is not legal in the first layer, a contradiction. This implies that the vertices in the set V = {v i1 , . . . , v i k } are colored with all the colors. We claim that V is a also an independent set. Towards a contradiction, assume there exist j, r ∈ [k] such that {v ij , v ir } ∈ E. Then we have that a ij and a ir form the trading cycle (a ij , b c(vi j ) , a ir , b c(vi r ) ) in layer 1 + i r , a contradiction to Proposition 2.3.
Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we considered a new generalization of the Assignment problem where each agent is equipped with multiple incomplete preference lists and we defined a new natural concept of optimality. We considered several natural parameters and we presented a comprehensive picture of the parameterized complexity of the problem with respect to them.
Our results show that the problem of finding an α-globally optimal assignment is, in general, computationally hard, and that it gives better results when the parameter depends on #agents (and α or ) than when it depends on #items (and α or ). We proved that the problem is unlikely to have an XP algorithm with respect to the parameter α + + d. We provided an O * (k!) algorithm for the parameter k = #agents and a double-exponential kernel for the parameter k = #items + . Both results show that the problem is FPT with respect to these parameters. We also proved that O * (k!) is essentially a tight lower bound on the running time under ETH for even larger parameters than #agents such as #agents + #items + α and #agents + #items + ( − α). Moreover, we proved that the problem admits a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter #agents + but is unlikely to admit one with respect to all the other parameters that we considered. Lastly, we proved that the problem is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameters #items + α and #items + ( − α). However, two question are still open:
1. Is it possible to obtain a (not polynomial) kernel for the parameter k = #items + with size substantially smaller than O * ((m!) +1 )? 2. Is it possible to obtain an algorithm with a better running time than O * (k!) for the parameter k = #agents + #items + ? It can be shown using a similar reduction from 3-SAT that the problem cannot be solved in time 2 o(k) under ETH. Maybe a 2 O(k) -algorithm can be achieved.
Continuing our research, it might be interesting to study the problem with "weaker" definitions of optimality, for example:
1. Finding an assignment such that for every group of k agents there exist α layers where they do not appear together in a trading cycle. 2. Finding an assignment such that there exists α layers, in which the maximal length of a trading cycle is at most c, for a given c ∈ N.
For the first suggestion, A "verification" variant can also be suggested, i.e. given assignment p, check whether every group of k agents do not appear together in a trading cycle in at least α layers.
